He was radicalised in , officials said, and his communications with the terror group "continued right up until the end, the very night before he started shooting". The expelled Saudi students were found to have had jihadist material and indecent images of children in their possession, investigators have said, but none were accused of aiding the killer.
US Attorney General William Barr vowed that Saudi Arabia would conduct a review to determine if any soldiers should face military discipline or criminal charges in the US. The investigation continues. In a statement on Monday, the Saudi embassy in Washington DC said it "reiterates its sincerest condolences to the American people".
It added: "But we will never let the terrorists win, or allow their acts of hatred to divide us. US expels 21 Saudi military cadets after gun attack. US navy base gunman 'watched mass-shooting videos'.
The quagmire in Iraq also eroded the parallel mission in Afghanistan. With American attention focused on Iraq, and only limited U. The deployment of U. In Afghanistan, Barack Obama ordered a surge of U.
In , U. At the end of the year, American troops left Iraq. There was, finally, a sense of closure. The fifth phase, from , was the era of transformation, as once again, U. The following year, al-Qaeda repudiated its former affiliate. But far from collapsing as an organization, ISIS subsequently swept into northern Iraq and declared a global caliphate. Meanwhile, in the often-forgotten war in Afghanistan, American troops were withdrawn and the Taliban made steady gains, with the campaign left teetering between stalemate and failure.
Victory would mean achieving core aims at an acceptable cost relative to the benefits. Al-Qaeda did meet some of its goals: With limited resources, bin Laden gained incredible notoriety and inflicted enormous damage on a great power.
But in a broader analysis, bin Laden failed. Yes, U. Crucially, al-Qaeda was unable to mobilize Muslims around a strict Islamist identity that transcended other loyalties. And national, tribal, and other local identities remain profoundly important from the Palestinians to the Pakistanis.
From , confidence in bin Laden collapsed in many Muslim-majority countries, falling from 59 percent to 26 percent in Indonesia, and from 56 percent to 13 percent in Jordan. In a poll taken in 11 Muslim countries, a median of just 13 percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, whereas 57 percent had an unfavorable view.
Since December , Ayman Al Zawahiri has congratulated Al Baghdadi for the establishment of the so-called Islamic State and has reiterated his plea for fighters in Iraq to overcome their differences in the aftermath of fighting between the Islamic Emirate and other Sunni insurgent groups. The operations of Al Qaeda affiliates continue to be complemented by centrally-planned ideological outreach activities. In a January 30, audiotape, for example, Ayman al Zawahiri identified "three foundations" of Al Qaeda's political ideology and applied them to events in Iraq and elsewhere.
The "three foundations," as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows:. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi have applied these and other similar principles to issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories. In both of his December statements, for example, Bin Laden clearly stated his view that democracies, constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems rather than "the law of God.
He also frequently characterized the Iraqi government as illegitimate and collaborationist, echoing to his January post-election statement that his followers in Iraq would "not accept the rule of anyone but that of God and His Prophet [Mohammed].
Bin Laden's December statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi monarchy. Al Zawahiri also dismissed Afghan, Egyptian, and Iraqi elections as incomplete and argued that the United States and its allies would not have supported the elections if the results may have yielded Islamist governments that could oppose U.
Elected Islamists also have received criticism for not living up to Al Qaeda leaders' expectations. In December , Al Zawahiri pointedly criticized the Palestinian group Hamas for failing to demand "that Palestine have an Islamic constitution before entering any elections.
Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri have based their calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslim citizens would empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, or shura. Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement.
Elements of similar strategic thinking appeared in statements issued by Al Zawahiri and Al Zarqawi from through A summary follows:.
In a July statement, Al Zawahiri outlined "a near-term plan and a long-term plan" for achieving Al Qaeda objectives:. The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training.
Thus, it is a must to hurry to the fields of jihad for two reasons: The first is to defeat the enemies of the Ummah and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second is for jihadi preparation and training to prepare for the next stage of the jihad. The "next stage" remains largely undefined in available statements from Al Qaeda leaders, and efforts to define long term goals are likely to prove divisive in light of evident differences in Iraq and other conflict zones over short term strategy and tactics.
Variations in the intensity and prominence of Al Qaeda leaders' anti-Israeli rhetoric have fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network's need for support—becoming more pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda's actions have alienated supporters or as part of a more outright ideological appeal. Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda's cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U.
Other Al Qaeda figures have alluded to the desirability of attacks on and eventual conflict with Israel. In January , Al Zarqawi claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on northern Israel, which he claimed was personally ordered by Osama Bin Laden.
He described the attack as "the beginning of a blessed action to strike the Zionist enemy at the heart of its existence. Al Qaeda leaders' statements reveal sophisticated consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, particularly with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil as "the basis of industry" in the global economy.
In an interview reportedly conducted on or around the fourth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Al Zawahiri urged "mujahidin to concentrate their campaigns on the Muslims' stolen oil" and to "not allow the thieves ruling [Muslim] countries to control this oil. Statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri urging attacks on oil infrastructure and military supply lines could indicate a shift in Al Qaeda's strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical energy production infrastructure.
A string of attempted attacks on oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia and Yemen since early have been heralded by some jihadist media outlets as operations conforming to Al Qaeda leaders' calls for economic warfare against the United States and its regional allies.
The Saudi Arabian government has sought to discredit Al Qaeda affiliates by portraying their attempted attacks on oil facilities as a threat to the economic lifeblood of the Saudi population. Statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, Sayf al Adl, and Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and operational affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two sequential goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and, ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.
The political prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in the Islamic principle known as tawhid , or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system. Throughout their statements, Al Qaeda founders and affiliates characterize as "infidels" those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the Islamic world.
Al Qaeda's diverse statements contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various target audiences. In his early statements, for example, Osama Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific groups in Saudi society could support Al Qaeda. In his and statements addressed to the U. Bin Laden's earlier statements also addressed the American public in several instances that he since has characterized as attempts to explain his motives and outline steps the United States should have taken in order to avoid Al Qaeda attacks.
Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda leaders' religious and political rhetoric has remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad. Non-Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and other sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish secular democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be insufficiently Islamic.
Bin Laden has often coupled his "Islamic-unity" rhetoric with litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U. Following September 11, , Bin Laden has appealed directly to national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.
Although Bin Laden's ideological rhetoric has remained relatively consistent, he and other Al Qaeda leaders have placed varying levels of emphasis on specific strategic objectives and tactics in their statements over the years. In statements addressed to U. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda's operational record seems to indicate that its leaders' commitment to specific national causes and limited political objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world.
For example, Bin Laden's rhetorical treatment of the presence of U. In messages to regional audiences, Bin Laden and his deputies have characterized U. In his December statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U. From a strategic perspective, statements from Al Zawahiri and others advocate for a phased struggle, in which the first goal is the expulsion of U.
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Turning his focus to the internal politics of the Islamic world, Bin Laden urged Muslims to find a leader to unite them and establish a "pious caliphate" that would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of finance and social conduct.
Although he possesses no traditional Islamic religious credentials or authority, Bin Laden issued a fatwa, or religious edict, in that claimed that the United States had made "a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims" 13 through its policies in the Islamic world.
The fatwa made use of the principle of defensive jihad to argue that U. The statement also announced the formation of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders," which consisted of a tacit alliance between Bin Laden, his supporters, and a number of regional Islamic militant groups. Following Al Qaeda's bombings of the U.
The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary "in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip [the U.
Cole in Yemen , Bin Laden refused to take direct responsibility for the attacks, but claimed that he approved of the strikes and shared the motivations of the individuals who had carried them out. Bin Laden argued that the bombings should be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for U. Osama Bin Laden's longstanding threats to strike the United States came to fruition on September 11, , and Bin Laden and others subsequently issued several statements confirming Al Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks on New York and Washington.
Following an established pattern, Bin Laden acknowledged his support for the hijackers and repeated his claim that strikes on American targets should be viewed by Muslims and Americans as a defensively motivated response to perceived American aggression in the Islamic world. Statements attributed to Bin Laden promised further attacks and sought to justify Al Qaeda's targeting of American civilians by arguing that American society was morally corrupt and that American civilians should be held accountable for the policies of their democratically elected government.
Several Al Qaeda statements have addressed the motives for the Embassy bombings and other terrorist operations, but relatively few statements have been made regarding Al Qaeda's strategic goals in planning and executing the September 11, , attacks on New York and Washington.
A text attributed to Al Qaeda military commander Sayf Al Adl released in May identifies three primary objectives for the September 11 attacks. Al Adl indicates that in the opinion of Al Qaeda's leadership, this primary objective was "partially achieved," although "other strikes" would have had.
By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.
However, Al Adl does not identify specific planned attacks that may have been disrupted since September Al Qaeda's second objective, as identified by Al Adl, was to signal and support the "emergence of a new virtuous leadership" dedicated to opposing "the Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition" that Al Qaeda blames for a litany of social and political ills in the Islamic world. Analysts have associated this stated objective with Al Qaeda leaders' views of themselves as the vanguard of a broader global Islamic movement and their desire to inspire political upheaval and change across the Islamic world.
The third and "ultimate objective," according to Al Adl, "was to prompt [the United States] to come out of its hole. Reflecting on the subsequent U. Al Adl and others have conceded that the attacks on New York and Washington were not totally successful, while arguing that the September 11 attack "was enough to prompt the Americans to carry out the anticipated response" -- namely direct military action within the Islamic world.
Both Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri have criticized the population and governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their calls to arms and for cooperating with the United States and its allies.
These criticisms have been coupled with renewed calls for armed "resistance" against the United States and its allies from Al Zawahiri, Al Adl, Al Zarqawi, and others.
Over the last year and a half, Bin Laden has addressed the governments and citizens of Europe and the United States directly in an effort to discourage support for their respective foreign policies in the Islamic world. In April , Bin Laden offered Europeans a "truce" if they agreed to abandon their support for the United States and their military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The offer was resoundingly rejected by European leaders and their citizens.
In October , on the eve of the U. It was crowned by the announcement of Bush Jr. Each message was addressed to a specific audience and revealed Bin Laden's perspectives on unfolding events in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories. The first tape, released on December 16, , received media attention for its praise of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group's attack on the U. In the tape, Bin Laden appealed directly to "the silent ulema" religious scholars and business and community leaders in Saudi Arabia to withdraw their support for the ruling Al Saud family.
Iraq and Al Qaeda's Ideology. A second Bin Laden tape, released on December 27, , underscored Al Qaeda's interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. On a tactical level, Bin Laden has encouraged Islamist insurgents in Iraq to work with "Socialist" groups Baathists and compared cooperation between Islamists and Baathists to Arab and Persian collaboration against the Byzantine empire in the 7th.
The brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him in all that which is good. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation.
The nation today has a very rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it. He has applied similar disregard for ethnic, linguistic, and ideological differences in issuing condemnations of so-called collaborators; identifying Arabs cooperating with Iraqi and coalition authorities as equally guilty parties. Both refer to Iraq as an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas.
The Three Foundations. Al Qaeda's strategic analysis and the operations of its affiliates continue to be supported by centrally planned ideological outreach activities. In a January 30, audiotape, for example, Ayman Al Zawahiri identified "three foundations" of Al Qaeda's political ideology and applied them to events in Iraq and elsewhere.
Al Zawahiri, who is regarded as Al Qaeda's chief ideologue, described Al Qaeda's core principles in sharp contrast to secular and. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin, who resists occupation, is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab from Rabi'ah or Mudar tribes.
The most pressing duty after faith is repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its lands.
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